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Abstract
This paper studies the degree to which country differences in intellectual
property rights protection affect the choice of companies for a particular mode
of international inter-firm R&D partnering. It focuses on the preference of
companies for either an equity joint venture or a contractual partnership. We
find that international differences in intellectual property rights protection are a
significant factor: with less secure protection, firms choose R&D joint ventures
rather than contractual partnerships. The level of technological change in
industries has an inverse effect on the preference for international R&D joint
ventures.
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Introduction
This paper studies the effect of different regimes of intellectual
property rights protection on the preference of companies for
particular forms of international inter-firm R&D partnership. It
particularly looks at the choice for either equity-based interna-
tional R&D joint ventures or contractual international R&D
partnerships. In this context, we shall pay attention to a number
of specific issues that refer to the international differences in
intellectual property rights protection and the role that techno-
logical change might play in all of this.
This contribution builds on a small number of previous studies,
such as Pisano (1989) and Oxley (1999). Pisano’s (1989) study was
considering mainly intellectual property rights protection and the
preference for particular forms of inter-firm partnership in the US
biotechnology industry. His study suggests that companies prefer
equity-based partnerships to contractual agreements when they are
confronted with higher levels of specific knowledge transfer, when
uncertainty surrounding partnerships increases, and when small-
number bargaining conditions create risk. Oxley’s (1999) seminal
study on a somewhat similar set of questions presented an analysis
of the choice between equity and contractual partnerships from
the perspective of US companies within a limited number of high-
tech sectors. Her study indicates that in international partnerships
established during the 1980s both the nature of the actual
transactions within a partnership and the ‘quality’ of the institu-
tional environment for intellectual property rights protection
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partnerships. When US companies were partnering
companies from countries with weaker intellectual
property rights protection standards, they preferred
to enter into an equity-based partnership rather
than engage in a contractual agreement.
Following directions for further study mentioned
in Oxley (1999), we shall analyse intellectual
property rights protection and the preference of
companies for particular forms of international
partnerships for a wider range of industries and
for companies from a large number of countries.
We study over 2000 international partnerships set
up by nearly 2000 companies from 53 countries.
Our analysis will concentrate on a specific group of
inter-firm partnerships, that is, international R&D
partnerships, because in these joint R&D activities
the protection of intellectual property rights is
more crucial than in other forms of partnering
such as standard customer–supplier relationships,
second-sourcing or joint marketing agreements
(Teece, 1986; Osborn and Baughn, 1990; Dussauge
and Garrette, 1999).
Our research focuses on the period from the mid
1970s to the end of the 1990s when intellectual
property rights protection, and in particular patent-
related property rights protection, appeared to still
diverge substantially between many countries at
different levels of economic and technological
development. Also, during that period many com-
panies were still building up experience in inter-
national R&D partnering with companies from
countries from a less developed intellectual prop-
erty rights regime. As such, each of these new
partnerships can be seen as a crucial strategic
decision. In that sense, our contribution can high-
light a number of important aspects of the inter-
national strategic behaviour of companies and their
choices with regard to the form of international
inter-firm partnering in the context of intellectual
property rights protection.
In the following section, we shall develop a small
set of hypotheses and some basic theoretical under-
standing of relevant phenomena. The subsequent
section discusses our sample, data collection, and
the variables that we shall analyse. After the
presentation of the results, we shall discuss these
results separately and draw some major conclusions
with an outline of future research.
Theory and hypotheses
In terms of organisational and legal features, the
various inter-firm partnerships that share R&D
activities fall into two basic forms of governance:
equity-based joint ventures and contractual R&D
partnerships (Hagedoorn, 2002). Joint ventures are
separate organisational units created and con-
trolled by two or more parent companies. Within
the spectrum of ‘hybrids’ between markets and
hierarchies, joint ventures represent a relatively
high level of hierarchical control, as parent com-
panies share formal control over the joint venture
through equity sharing (Harrigan, 1985; William-
son, 1996). In general, the ownership structure of
joint ventures is determined by equity participation
through the ex ante allocation of ownership shares
to the parent companies. This generates a govern-
ance structure where the sponsoring companies can
monitor the activities of the joint venture as they
are represented on the board of directors. This
equity sharing is also expected to align the motiva-
tion of the partners, creating mutual interests,
which reduces the possibilities for opportunistic
behaviour by partners (Pisano, 1989; Oxley, 1997).
R&D joint ventures are examples of these semi-
autonomous operating ventures that perform R&D
and a number of other functions, usually extending
their other activities into production, marketing
and various services (Dussauge and Garrette, 1999;
Hagedoorn, 2002).
Contractual R&D partnerships, such as joint R&D
pacts and joint development agreements, cover
common R&D activities of two or more companies
on a project or programme basis. Such undertakings
imply the temporary sharing of some R&D
resources in R&D projects or R&D programmes for
which companies agree on the shared input of
human resources, technologies, laboratories and
equipment. Compared with R&D joint ventures,
contractual R&D partnerships are, owing to their
intended temporary nature and their lack of equity
sharing and organisational control, characterised
by a lower level of hierarchical control (Oxley,
1999; Hagedoorn, 2002).
Given the fact that it is by definition impossible
to contractually specify all concrete results of joint
R&D in advance, while there is also no adminis-
trative and organisational control based on equity,
these contractual R&D partnerships are to be seen
as clear examples of incomplete contracts. More
specifically, the incomplete nature of these con-
tractual R&D arrangements is the result of two
types of ex ante information deficiency that are
affected by the uncertainty surrounding R&D. First,
it is often extremely difficult, if not impossible, to
anticipate the exact nature and extent of future
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application of this future knowledge, which is
generated through cooperative R&D projects. The
speed of technological development and the con-
stant changes in R&D activities in many R&D-
intensive sectors of industry add to the uncertainty
regarding the assessment of the value of future
knowledge (Freeman and Soete, 1997). Second,
there is usually some degree of asymmetry in the
knowledge capabilities of these partners because
the sharing of identical capabilities would only
generate some economies of scale but no econo-
mies of scope. This asymmetry in the context of the
sharing and developing of information based on
proprietary and tacit knowledge also implies that
companies do not have a precise ex ante under-
standing of the value of the joint knowledge base of
the partners to the extent that it can be written into
a contract (Chi and Roehl, 1997).
The preference for equity joint ventures
or contractual partnerships
The literature on the choice that companies make
with regard to the governance structure of joint
activities, such as equity joint ventures and con-
tractual partnerships, focuses on three main topics:
the monitoring of the actual collaboration, the
enforcement of contractual terms, and the ade-
quate specification of property rights (Pisano, 1989;
Williamson, 1996; Oxley, 1999). Our understand-
ing of the difficulties that companies might face
with monitoring joint activities and enforcing
contractual terms related to property rights suggests
that the more relevant these difficulties are, the
more likely it is that companies will prefer a more
hierarchical mode of shared governance that
increases their actual control, that is, control
through a joint venture. Moreover, if inter-firm
partnerships involve the exchange of technology,
which is by definition the case when companies
jointly undertake R&D, there is a chance of
involuntary knowledge and technology leakage,
indicating serious appropriability hazards (Teece,
1986; Oxley, 1997). Ceteris paribus, the higher the
appropriability hazards in inter-firm partnering, the
more companies will prefer the joint venture mode.
These particular aspects of decision-making with
regard to the mode of governance for inter-firm
collaboration seem highly relevant for understand-
ing international R&D partnerships. As discussed in
the above, joint R&D is by definition an uncertain
activity for which it is very difficult, if not
impossible, to define ex ante both the complete
results and their implications for future activities.
Costs can be estimated for the short term, but the
larger the R&D programme, and the longer its time
horizon, the more difficult it will be to give an
accurate estimate. Monitoring of R&D activities is
possible but, in the case of international R&D
partnering, the international nature of collaboration
only adds to the uncertain nature of the activity. In
international R&D cooperation the appropriability
hazards could, owing to a lack of familiarity with
circumstances in other countries, be even larger
than in domestic inter-firm R&D partnering. Also,
the enforcement of contractual terms for interna-
tional R&D partnering depends largely on the
specific legal system that regulates such partner-
ships. It is well known that there are large interna-
tional differences in contract law, and the actual
enforcement of such laws is even non-existent in
many countries (Ginarte and Park, 1997; Varsakelis,
2001). Most relevant in the current context are the
international differences in intellectual property
rights protection. In general, the literature suggests
that the more economically developed countries
are, the more they have established a legal system
that enforces contract law, and the stronger is their
intellectual property rights protection (Marron and
Steel, 2000; Varsakelis, 2001).
The above suggests a number of important
questions with respect to the preference of compa-
nies for international R&D joint ventures or inter-
national contractual R&D partnerships in the
context of:
(1) international differences in intellectual property
rights protection;
(2) the role of technological change in their
competitive environment.
In the following sections, these questions regard-
ing some specifics of the governance of R&D
partnering will be discussed further in a differen-
tiated international and sectoral setting. Given the
emphasis on the role of intellectual property rights
protection and the appropriability hazard of
knowledge leakage to partners, the hypotheses
are formulated from the perspective of the com-
pany (partner) with its headquarters in the country
with the higher level of intellectual property rights
protection.
The effect of international differences
in intellectual property rights protection
Countries show considerable differences with
regard to important aspects of intellectual property
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property rights can be established by those seeking
legal protection. Other major differences refer to
the broadness of the interpretation of property
rights and the actual enforcement of property
rights protection by the authorities. These inter-
national differences in intellectual property rights
protection are most clearly demonstrated for
patents. Ginarte and Park (1997) analyse these
international differences in terms of five major
categories of patent rights protection:
(1) the extent of coverage, that is, the patentability
of inventions in major patent classes;
(2) the participation of a country in international
agreements;
(3) the provisions for loss of protection;
(4) the legal enforcement mechanisms;
(5) the duration of protection for a patent.
In general, the more economically developed a
country is, the higher it scores on these dimensions
of intellectual property rights protection (Rapp and
Rozek, 1990; Ginarte and Park, 1997; Marron and
Steel, 2000; Primo Braga et al., 2000; Varsakelis,
2001). The level of intellectual property rights
protection in a country is also an important
predictor for its attraction of foreign direct invest-
ment (Dunning, 1993; Ferrantino, 1993; Lee and
Mansfield, 1996; Seyoum, 1996; Mille, 1997; Saggi,
2000; Smarzynska, 2002) and international trade
(Ferrantino, 1993; Fink and Primo Braga, 1999).
The effective protection of intellectual property
rights through patent laws and related measures
reduces the risk for companies when they engage in
various international activities that demand foreign
direct investment, extensive and long-term trading
relationships or international inter-firm partnering.
Essentially, any international transaction with a
company from a country with a well-established
intellectual property rights regime is less likely to be
subject to substantial appropriation hazards than
transactions with companies from countries that
offer little or no protection (Lee and Mansfield,
1996). Given the moral hazard in joint R&D, where,
as discussed in the above, there is always the risk of
unanticipated knowledge leakage, intellectual
property rights protection in international R&D
partnerships can be expected to be even more
relevant than in most other international transac-
tions and investments. Therefore, the strength
of intellectual property rights protection in parti-
cular countries is expected to be an important
institutional and environmental factor in the
choices that companies make when they engage
in international R&D partnerships (Muralidharan
and Phatak, 1999).
1
Companies from a domestic environment char-
acterised by substantial intellectual property rights
protection are confronted with higher appropri-
ability hazards and potentially subsequent costs
when they engage in contractual agreements with
companies from countries with relatively poorer
conditions of intellectual property rights protec-
tion. Equity joint ventures are expected to be
reserved for circumstances with such greater appro-
priability hazards because they offer managerial
and organisational control and increase the possi-
bilities for adequate monitoring and oversight
(Teece, 1986; Oxley, 1999). This implies that
companies from countries with relatively well-
developed systems of intellectual property rights
protection will, owing to increased appropriability
hazards, prefer to form equity-based R&D partner-
ships rather than contractual R&D partnerships
with companies from countries with less developed
systems of intellectual property rights protection.
Hence:
H1: The preference of a company for hierarchical
control in an international R&D partnership is
inversely related to the level of intellectual
property rights protection in the home country
of its partner.
The effect of sectoral technological change
Contributions by Harrigan and Newman (1990),
Ciborra (1991), Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven
(1996), Gomes-Casseres (1996), Oster (1999) and
Hagedoorn and Duysters (2002) suggest that, in
general, inter-firm partnerships are associated with
sectors of industry where learning and flexibility
are important features of the competitive land-
scape. Under these conditions, companies learn
from a variety of partners in a flexible setting of
temporary partnerships. Link and Bauer (1989),
Mytelka (1991), Dussauge and Garrette (1999) and
Hagedoorn (2002) indicate that many of these
partnerships are concentrated in a limited number
of mainly R&D-intensive industries.
A related body of literature suggests that the level
of technological change in industries might influ-
ence the preferred form of governance for partner-
ing by companies. According to Harrigan (1985,
1988), rapid technological change in industries
induces the formation of somewhat informal forms
of partnering such as non-equity, contractual
Intellectual property rights John Hagedoorn et al
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that the technological instability of industrial
sectors is a crucial factor in explaining different
patterns for joint ventures and contractual partner-
ships. Yu and Tang (1992) emphasise that stable
sectoral environments favour joint venturing as the
main form of inter-firm partnering, whereas
unstable sectoral environments lead to a preference
for contractual arrangements. Auster (1987) and
Hagedoorn and Narula (1996) found that com-
panies involved in international partnerships
preferred contractual agreements to equity-based
partnerships as the technology involved became
more sophisticated.
Although these contributions differ with respect
to their theoretical backgrounds, major research
questions and the actual indicators used in
research, a general picture emerges from this
literature. Contractual agreements are particularly
preferred in high-tech industries, that is, sectors
with high levels of technological change, whereas
joint ventures play a role of disproportionate
importance in other industries. We expect similar
patterns for joint ventures and contractual alliances
in international R&D partnering. This implies that
the form of governance for international R&D
partnering, as chosen by companies, is probably
also affected by the level of technological change in
the industry in which their international R&D
partnering takes place. Thus:
H2: The preference of a company for hierarchical
control in an international R&D partnership is
inversely related to the level of technological
change in the sector of industry in which an
international R&D partnership is established.
Research methods
Sample and data collection
We shall analyse a sample of 2005 inter-
national R&D partnerships, taken from the MERIT-
CATI databank. These 2005 partnerships are
sponsored by 1956 companies from 53 countries.
Of these international R&D partnerships, 35% are
joint ventures and 65% are contractual R&D
partnerships.
The MERIT-CATI databank contains information
on thousands of technology-related inter-firm
partnerships in various sectors, ranging from
high-technology sectors such as pharmaceutical
biotechnology to less technology-intensive sectors
such as food and beverages. Various sources from
the international financial and specialised techni-
cal press were consulted to systematically collect
information on inter-firm partnerships. Within the
databank there is information on each partnership,
and some information on companies participating
in these partnerships. Partnerships are defined as
mutual interests between independent companies
that are not linked through majority ownership.
Agreements formed between companies and gov-
ernmental or academic institutions are generally
not included in the database unless they involve at
least two commercial companies. The current CATI
database records only those partnerships that
involve some form of jointly undertaken R&D.
Information is collected primarily on joint ventures
with R&D activities and contractual R&D partner-
ships such as R&D pacts and joint development
agreements. Other types of agreement such as
production and marketing partnerships are not
included. In other words, this material is related
primarily to R&D collaboration and technology
development, that is, those partnerships for which
a combined innovative activity is at least part of the
agreement (see also Hagedoorn, 2002).
Our research covers the period 1975–1999. The
international R&D partnerships formed between
the pairs of companies in this sample are unique
and first combinations, adding to the crucial nature
of their choice for a particular governance structure
for an R&D partnership.
Dependent variable
Our hypotheses associate the differences in the
regime of intellectual property rights protection in
the home countries of partnering companies and
the sectoral level of technological change with the
governance structure of R&D partnerships, that is,
the preference for an equity R&D joint venture or
a contractual R&D partnership. The dependent
variable represents the choice of the governance
structure for each R&D partnership from the
perspective of the partner from the country with
the highest level of intellectual property rights
protection. This dependent variable, R&D partner-
ship, is coded 1 if the partnership is organised as an
equity joint venture and 0 if the partnership is
organised as a contractual partnership.
Independent variables
The ratio that measures the difference in intellec-
tual property rights protection in the home
countries of partnering companies, inter-
national IPR ratio, indicates the basic international
Intellectual property rights John Hagedoorn et al
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tion (Hypothesis 1). The measure of country
differences in the intellectual property rights
protection index is based on the information found
in Ginarte and Park (1997) and additional data
provided by Walter Park. As already explained in
the above, their index refers to a number of major
categories for patent rights protection. Previous
research indicates that the level of patent protec-
tion appears to be a good indication of the more
general level of intellectual property rights protec-
tion (Marron and Steel, 2000; Ostergard, 2000).
Ginarte and Park (1997) provide an index of patent
rights protection with 5-year intervals for a large
number of countries.
For our analysis, the relevant indexes refer to
the years 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995.
We shall relate each R&D partnership and the
countries of the sponsoring companies to the first
year of the interval given for these patent rights
protection indexes. For instance, all partnerships
found in the year 1977 refer to the patent rights
protection indexes for the earlier year 1975. It
turned out that taking the later year for which
patent rights protection indexes are available, in
this case 1980, does not have a significant effect on
the measurement of this variable. In the actual
statistical analysis, we shall apply ratios for the
indexes of patent rights protection to measure the
difference in the intellectual property rights protec-
tion of the home countries of both partners. Given
the positive values of ratios, where differentials
indicate the degree to which the intellectual
property rights protection in the home country of
the partner are weaker, the actual measurement of
this ratio was transferred to a negative value in
order to interpret the findings in the context of the
expected inverse relationship mentioned in
Hypothesis 1.
The variable for sectoral technological change
(Hypothesis 2) measures the average R&D intensity
of sectors of industry during the 1980s and 1990s as
given in various OECD publications. This R&D
intensity indicates the degree to which companies
in industries devote resources to R&D that generate
a continuous flow of newly developed technolo-
gies, new products and new processes, representing
differences in the degree of sectoral technological
change (OECD, 1992; Freeman and Soete, 1997).
R&D intensities measure the R&D expenditures as a
percentage of output, ranging for instance from
22.7 for aerospace and defence to 0.8 in food and
beverages (OECD, 1992). We recoded the OECD
classification of industries to the industry cate-
gories found in the MERIT-CATI database.
Control variables
Consistent with prior research on international
partnerships, we included a number of control
variables for the specific characteristics of the two
companies in each international R&D partnership
and for some general characteristics of the coun-
tries from which partners originate. The literature
indicates that the size of companies and their size
differences might play a role in the partnership
formation process of companies (Berg et al., 1982;
Harrigan, 1988; Mytelka, 1991; Hagedoorn and
Schakenraad, 1994; Oxley, 1997; Hagedoorn and
Duysters, 2002). However, the empirical findings
from these studies appear to be somewhat incon-
clusive. The variable size ratio indicates the actual
difference in size between the partnering compa-
nies. The size of each company is measured in US$
million sales for the year the partnership was
established. Information on the size of companies
was accessed through well-known databases such as
Amadeus, Compustat, Disclosure, Securities Data
and Worldscope.
The experience of companies with setting up
partnerships is known to affect their partnering
behaviour positively (e.g. Ring and van de Ven,
1992; Gulati, 1995; Barkema et al., 1997; Dyer and
Singh, 1998). The variable average experience mea-
sures the average of a simple count of previous
partnerships for the two companies in the R&D
partnership (Oxley, 1999). The variable ratio of total
experience indicates the degree to which companies
in a partnership differ in their actual experience
with setting up inter-firm R&D partnerships. It is
calculated as the count of the previous partnerships
made by the company from the country with the
higher level of intellectual property rights protec-
tion divided by the count of the previous partner-
ship made by its partner. Both control variables for
experience count the number of all relevant R&D
partnerships of both companies, found in the
MERIT-CATI database, established since 1970 but
prior to the specific international R&D partnership
formed between the two companies.
The formation of R&D partnerships can also be
influenced by the difference in innovative capabil-
ities of companies, where larger differences indicate
that the ‘leading’ company would prefer to form an
equity partnership to have more control in order to
reduce appropriability hazards (Teece, 1986; Oxley,
1999). The ratio of patenting expresses the degree to
Intellectual property rights John Hagedoorn et al
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strengths in innovative capabilities. The actual
measurement is the number of patents that com-
panies have obtained during a 5-year period prior to
their R&D partnership, while controlling for size
differences. Data on patents are taken from the US
Patent and Trademark Office database (US Depart-
ment of Commerce). Although these US data could
imply a bias in favour of US companies and against
non-US firms, the patent literature suggests several
reasons for choosing US patent data (e.g. Patel and
Pavitt, 1991). Frequently mentioned are the impor-
tance of the US market, the genuine patent
protection offered by US authorities, and the level
of technological sophistication of the US market,
which makes it almost compulsory for non-US
companies to file patents in the USA.
We included two more or less standard control
variables from the international business literature
that characterise differences between the countries
from which companies in an international R&D
partnership originate. For cultural distance we have
used the well-known Kogut and Singh (1988) index
of cultural differences between countries, based on
Hofstede (1980). The ratio of the openness of the
economy refers to the ratio between two countries in
their share of total trade (exports plus imports) to
real GDP per capita (Summers and Heston, 1991).
For each of these country-based variables, we
expect that larger ratios might positively affect the
choice for equity R&D partnerships because these
dissimilarities imply a certain degree of unfamiliar-
ity for first-time collaborators. Finally, we include a
trend variable, time, to account for a possible
growth in the total number of R&D partnerships
over time and a gradual change in the distribution
of equity R&D partnerships and contractual part-
nerships (Hagedoorn and van Kranenburg, 2003).
This trend variable was calculated by assigning a
value to each specific year, corresponding to the
‘distance’ to the first year of the period under
investigation, that is, 1975.
Results
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and the
correlation matrix for the variables in this study.
Table 2 provides the results of a stepwise logit
analysis. Given the unambiguous nature of the
results for the various models, we shall discuss only
the results for the full model (model 4). Compared
with the other models, this full model has the
expected lowest log-likelihood value. Turning to
the hypothesis testing, it is clear that the results
demonstrate strong support for the hypotheses.
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the results indicate
that the preference of companies for hierarchical
control, through a joint venture mode for interna-
tional R&D partnering, is inversely related to the
strength of intellectual property rights protection
in the home country of their partner. We also
predicted that the level of technological change in
an industry would have an inverse effect on the
preference of companies for hierarchical control in
international R&D partnerships (Hypothesis 2).
Our results do indicate that there is a significant
negative effect, which suggests that establishing
international R&D partnerships in industries char-
acterised by higher levels of technological change
decreases the likelihood that these partnerships will
take the form of equity joint ventures.
As for the effects of the control variables, it turns
out that the variables for the size ratio, both
experience variables and the ratio of the openness
of the economy, have an insignificant impact on
the choice for equity or contractual R&D partner-
ships. Apparently, size differentials do not affect the
Table 1 Descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations (s.d.)) and bivariate correlations for all variables, N¼2005
Variable Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 Dependent variable 0.35 0.48
2 International IPR ratio  1.24 0.63  0.084
3 Sectoral technological change 8.74 5.28  0.307 0.056
4 Size ratio 270.21 7410.52  0.024 0.005 0.006
5 Average experience 18.33 39.70  0.043 0.030 0.052  0.004
6 Ratio of total experience 7.71 22.59  0.006  0.036 0.053 0.027 0.127
7 Ratio of patenting 172.52 594.46 0.061  0.026  0.017 0.010 0.065 0.223
8 Cultural distance 1.57 1.36 0.073 0.005  0.059  0.029 0.279 0.089  0.033
9 Ratio of openness of the economy 0.84 0.76 0.014 0.006 0.022 0.013 0.030 0.078  0.042 0.300
10 Time 15.24 6.33 0.150  0.029 0.183 0.045 0.184 0.150  0.021  0.088  0.047
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the form of an R&D partnership. We also found no
effect of the experience that companies have with
setting up partnerships on the structure of their
international partnership. The variables indicating
the degree to which companies differ with regard to
the openness of the economy in their home
country and the cultural distance between partners
also do not seem to affect their choice for any
particular form of international R&D partnering.
The other control variables do have a significant
effect on the preference for a particular form of
governance of international R&D partnerships. We
found a positive, significant effect for the degree
to which companies have dissimilar strengths in
innovative capabilities, indicating that, with
increasing differentials in these capabilities, com-
panies appear to prefer R&D joint ventures. Also,
the negative time trend shows that there is a clear
general tendency to gradually change to a prefer-
ence for contractual R&D partnerships.
In addition to the variables applied in the above,
we used a set of complementary variables such as
various measures for political risk in home coun-
tries of partners and the patenting intensity of the
home countries of partners. These variables were
highly correlated with the intellectual property
rights protection in countries, and consequently
they were dropped from the analysis (see also
Oxley, 1999; Sampson, 2004). We also analysed
the role of nominal differences for ratio-based
variables, and we applied log-transformed measures
of these nominal differences in order to control for
very large dissimilarities between partners. Both
exercises led to similar results.
Discussion
The above demonstrates that intellectual property
rights protection is an important aspect in the
decision-making regarding international inter-firm
R&D partnering. Admittedly, intellectual property
rights protection refers to a wider group of
intellectual properties than just patents. However,
the international differences in the efficiency of
patent protection, the broadness of patent protec-
tion, and the actual enforcement of patent laws
(Ginarte and Park, 1997) do indicate a general
intellectual property rights protection climate in a
country (Marron and Steel, 2000; Ostergard, 2000).
Apparently, companies do realise that in that
context international R&D partnerships can create
serious appropriability hazards unless the necessary
precautions are taken (Teece, 1986; Oxley, 1997).
International R&D partnerships appear to carry all
the flags that caution companies, in particular if
they are dealing with first-time encounters with
foreign partners. These precautions can be taken by
creating equity-based control in setting up separate
organisational entities, that is, joint ventures,
which allow for continuous monitoring of the joint
R&D activities. This monitoring is possible because
usually each sponsor is, based on its equity
participation, represented in the management of
the joint venture. An important finding of this
study is that international differences or similarities
in intellectual property rights protection seem to
Table 2 Estimation results of binomial logit analysis
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant 1.1011*** (0.1417)  0.0073 (0.2939) 1.7088*** (0.1617) 0.8690*** (0.3184)
International IPR ratio  0.9502*** (0.2225)  0.7046*** (0.2323)
Sectoral technological change  0.0999*** (0.0090)  0.0970*** (0.0091)
Size ratio  0.0003 (0.0005)  0.0003 (0.0004)  0.0003 (0.0004)  0.0002 (0.0004)
Average experience  0.0007 (0.0011)  0.0004 (0.0012) 0.0001 (0.0013) 0.0005 (0.0015)
Ratio of total experience 0.0045 (0.0028)  0.0035 (0.0029) 0.0052* (0.0030) 0.0046 (0.0030)
Ratio of patenting 0.0002** (0.0001) 0.0001* (0.0001) 0.0002** (0.0001) 0.0002* (0.0001)
Cultural distance 0.0840** (0.0366) 0.0895** (0.0375) 0.0544 (0.0395) 0.0616 (0.0404)
Ratio of openness of the economy  0.0403 (0.0616)  0.0333 (0.0622)  0.0122 (0.0658)  0.0115 (0.0666)
Time  0.1235*** (0.0092)  0.1270*** (0.0093)  0.1078*** (0.0097)  0.1111*** (0.0099)
N 2005 2005 2005 2005
Log likelihood  1308.948  1293.150  1183.111  1173.955
Standard errors in parentheses.
*Significant at po0.10; **significant at po0.05; ***significant at po0.01.
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inter-firm R&D partnerships.
The emphasis in this study on R&D partnerships
highlights an important aspect of the appropria-
bility hazards of shared activities, that is, the
possible leakage of knowledge. R&D partnerships
are, given the complementary nature of most
partnerships, characterised by information asym-
metry that increases the potential risk of knowledge
leakage (Chi and Roehl, 1997; Hagedoorn, 2002).
International differences in intellectual property
rights protection seem to also indicate major
differences in country levels of technological
capabilities (Rapp and Rozek, 1990; Ginarte and
Park, 1997; Primo Braga et al., 2000). This implies
that, apart from the fundamentally intrinsic uncer-
tainty of R&D, international cooperation without
adequate safeguards to counter involuntary knowl-
edge transfer would further increase the uncer-
tainty that already surrounds the outcome of joint
R&D. Joint ventures provide better protection and
monitoring than incomplete contracting through
R&D pacts and joint development agreements.
Support for this particular aspect of our under-
standing of the preference for particular forms of
governance is also found in the positive effect
of differences in innovative capabilities in pairs of
companies on their preference for equity-based
international R&D partnerships.
Important aspects of the above confirm some
findings in previous research by Oxley (1997) and
Sampson (2004). However, our contribution also
demonstrates that the relationship between inter-
national intellectual property rights protection and
the preference for particular forms of governance of
inter-firm partnering is of a general nature. Our
research shows that this relationship is relevant not
only for understanding the behaviour of US
companies and their choices with regard to orga-
nising their international R&D partnerships. It also
extends to companies from a large variety of other
countries that are confronted with asymmetries in
intellectual property rights protection. Our findings
also demonstrate that these insights are not only
relevant for a small number of high-tech industries
but also that they appear appropriate across-the-
board of a wider range of industries. Furthermore,
although a large number of countries partially
closed the gap in intellectual property rights
protection regimes in the context of Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) of
the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations,
major differences in intellectual property rights
protection are still in effect. In that context, our
results indicate that the relationship between
international intellectual property rights protection
and the preference for particular forms of govern-
ance of inter-firm partnering was still valid at the
end of the 1990s.
The level of technological change in sectors of
industry also affects the preference of companies
for particular modes of governance for interna-
tional R&D partnering. The more industries are
characterised by intensive R&D and technological
changes that create a constant flow of new products
and new processes, the more flexibility and orga-
nisational change appear to be relevant for compa-
nies in those industries (Harrigan, 1988; Oster,
1999). In particular, contractual R&D partnerships
play a major role in attempts made by companies to
answer the need for organisational flexibility as
they are constantly adjusting to frequent techno-
logical changes while monitoring new technologies
and introducing crucial innovations themselves
(Gomes-Casseres, 1996; Dussauge and Garrette,
1999; Oster, 1999). This does not apply only to
domestic partnerships; sectoral technological
changes also affect the preference for particular
modes of governance of international R&D partner-
ships. The findings of this study confirm previous
studies that suggest that joint ventures are preferred
in stable environments with relatively little tech-
nological change, whereas flexible, short-term con-
tractual partnerships are preferred in dynamic
environments characterised by higher levels of
technological change (Osborn and Baughn, 1990;
Hagedoorn, 2002).
Although not a central topic in our research, the
results for some variables are relevant for under-
standing some important questions regarding the
bearing of transaction or firm-level characteristics
on the type of partnership. Findings by Oxley
(1997) indicate that firm-level attributes such as
size (differences), experience with setting up part-
nerships, innovativeness of companies and the
industry in which a partnership operates would
have no effect on the form of inter-firm partner-
ships. Our research does indeed indicate similar
findings for size differentials between partners and
their experience with inter-firm partnering. How-
ever, differences in the innovativeness of partner-
ing companies and their sectoral technological
settings clearly play a role in our analysis. This
indicates that, in the context of international R&D
partnering, firm-level characteristics crucial to the
specific aim of this group of partnerships, that is,
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important aspects to be considered when contem-
plating the mode of governance for R&D partner-
ships. The larger the differential between the
innovative capabilities of partners, the more the
‘leading’ company will search for protection of
these capabilities by means of equity joint ventures.
The finding that, contrary to some other studies,
the experience with previous partnerships does not
have a significant effect on the governance of
international R&D partnerships can largely be
explained by the specific historical situation with
regard to R&D partnering. The number of R&D
partnerships did not really grow until the latter part
of the period under investigation, which implies
that most companies were able to build up
substantial experience only towards the end of the
period. In addition to this, it appears that compa-
nies might realise that experience as such can help
them assess a new situation, but a new
R&D partnership with a company from a less
developed IPR regime warrants a careful consi-
deration of control issues in international R&D
partnerships.
Conclusions
International differences in intellectual property
rights protection are a significant factor for com-
panies to consider when engaging in international
R&D partnerships. When companies find them-
selves in an environment with less secure intellec-
tual property rights protection, they tend to choose
equity-based R&D joint ventures rather than con-
tractual partnerships. The level of technological
change in industries has an inverse effect on the
preference for international R&D joint ventures.
International contractual R&D agreements, char-
acterised by organisational flexibility, are preferred
in R&D-intensive and innovative industries.
Although this study does reveal some very
important aspects of intellectual property rights
protection and international R&D partnering, it
still has certain limitations that indicate an agenda
for future research. First of all, there is still a clear
need for further studies based on larger samples
than the one used in this study. The current sample
is already larger, referring to a longer and more
recent period, and also more differentiated in terms
of industries and countries than the samples in
other studies. Nevertheless, future studies could
focus on a larger variety of forms of inter-firm
partnering, an even larger group of countries and a
more disaggregated sample of industries. Second,
other forms of intellectual property rights protec-
tion than patent protection, such as copyright and
software protection, seem to have become impor-
tant since the early 1990s. A combination of a study
of recent developments in other forms of intellec-
tual property rights protection with recent trends
and patterns in inter-firm partnering could gener-
ate additional insight into the management of
external knowledge transfer in an international
context. Third, a better understanding of the actual
transfer of knowledge in international partnerships
could benefit from research using a wider range of
detailed firm-level indicators, a better comprehen-
sion of sectoral characteristics, and more sophisti-
cated country-level measures than those currently
available.
Acknowledgements
We thank John Cantwell, Nicolai Foss, Bo Nielsen,
Joann Oxley, two anonymous referees of this journal,
and participants at seminars at the National University
of Singapore, Maastricht University, the Academy of
International Business, Stockholm, July 2004, and the
Academy of Management, New Orleans, August
2004, for valuable feedback on earlier versions of this
paper. We are particularly grateful to Walter Park for
providing additional data on international intellectual
property rights protection.
Notes
1As suggested by one of the reviewers, taxation,
subsidies, governmental protection and other institu-
tional factors might also have some effect on the
organizational and contractual choices that companies
make.
References
Auster, E.R. (1987) ‘International corporate linkages: dynamic
forms in changing environments’, Columbia Journal of World
Business 22(2): 3–13.
Barkema, H., Shenkar, O., Vermeulen, F. and Bell, J. (1997)
‘Working abroad, working with others: how firms learn to
operate international joint ventures’, Academy of Management
Journal 40(2): 426–442.
Berg, S.V., Duncan, J. and Friedman, P. (1982) Joint Venture
Strategies and Corporate Innovation, Oelgeschlager, Gunn and
Hain: Cambridge.
Chi, T. and Roehl, T.W. (1997) ‘The structure of inter-firm
exchanges in business know-how: evidence from international
collaborative ventures’, Managerial and Decision Economics
18(4): 279–294.
Intellectual property rights John Hagedoorn et al
184
Journal of International Business StudiesCiborra, C. (1991) ‘Alliances as Learning Experiments: Coopera-
tion, Competition and Change in High-Tech Industries’, in L.K.
Mytelka (ed.) Strategic Partnerships and the World Economy,
Pinter: London, pp. 51–77.
Dunning, J. (1993) Multinational Enterprises and the Global
Economy, Addison-Wesley: London.
Dussauge, P. and Garrette, B. (1999) Cooperative Strategy—
Competing Successfully Through Strategic Alliances, Wiley:
Chichester.
Dyer, J. and Singh, H. (1998) ‘The relational view: cooperative
strategy and sources of inter-organizational competitive
advantage’, Academy of Management Review 23(4): 660–679.
Eisenhardt, K.M. and Schoonhoven, C.B. (1996) ‘Resource-
based view of strategic alliance formation: strategic and social
effects in entrepreneurial firms’, Organization Science 7(2):
136–150.
Ferrantino, M. (1993) ‘The effect of intellectual property rights
on international trade and investment’, Weltwirtschaftliches
Archiv 129: 300–331.
Fink, C. and Primo Braga, C.A. (1999) ‘How stronger protection
of intellectual property rights affects international trade flows’,
Policy Research Working Paper 2051, The World Bank:
Washington, DC.
Freeman, C. and Soete, L. (1997) The Economics of Industrial
Innovation, Pinter: London.
Ginarte, J.C. and Park, W.G. (1997) ‘Determinants of patent
rights: a cross-national study’, Research Policy 26(3): 283–301.
Gomes-Casseres, B. (1996) The Alliance Revolution: The New Shape
of Business Rivalry, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA.
Gulati, R. (1995) ‘Social structure and alliance formation
patterns: a longitudinal analysis’, Administrative Science Quar-
terly 40(4): 619–652.
Hagedoorn, J. (2002) ‘Inter-firm R&D partnerships: an overview
of major trends and patterns since 1960’, Research Policy
31(4): 477–492.
Hagedoorn, J. and Duysters, G. (2002) ‘External sources of
innovative capabilities: the preference for strategic alliances or
mergers and acquisitions’, Journal of Management Studies
39(2): 167–188.
Hagedoorn, J. and Narula, R. (1996) ‘Choosing organizational
modes of strategic technology partnering: international and
sectoral differences’, Journal of International Business Studies
27(2): 265–284.
Hagedoorn, J. and Schakenraad, J. (1994) ‘The effect of strategic
technology alliances on company performance’, Strategic
Management Journal 15(4): 291–311.
Hagedoorn, J. and van Kranenburg, H. (2003) ‘Growth patterns
in R&D partnerships: an exploratory statistical study’, Interna-
tional Journal of Industrial Organization 21: 517–531.
Harrigan, K.R. (1985) Strategies for Joint Ventures, Lexington
Books: Lexington, MA.
Harrigan, K.R. (1988) ‘Joint ventures and competitive strategy’,
Strategic Management Journal 9(2): 141–158.
Harrigan, K.R. and Newman, W.H. (1990) ‘Bases of interorga-
nization co-operation: propensity, power, persistence’, Journal
of Management Studies 27: 417–434.
Hofstede, G.H. (1980) Culture’s Consequences: International
Differences in Work-Related Values, Sage Publications: Beverly
Hills, CA.
Kogut, B. and Singh, H. (1988) ‘The effect of national culture on
the choice of entry mode’, Journal of International Business
Studies 19(Fall): 411–432.
Lee, J. and Mansfield, E. (1996) ‘Intellectual property protection
and US foreign direct investment’, Review of Economics and
Statistics 77(2): 181–186.
Link, A.N. and Bauer, L.L. (1989) Cooperative Research in US
Manufacturing: Assessing Policy Initiatives and Corporate Stra-
tegies, Lexington Books: Lexington, MA.
Marron, D.B. and Steel, D.G. (2000) ‘Which countries protect
intellectual property? The case of software piracy’, Economic
Inquiry 38(2): 159–174.
Mille, A. (1997) ‘Copyright in the cyberspace era’, European
Intellectual Property Review 19: 570–577.
Muralidharan, R. and Phatak, A. (1999) ‘International R&D
activity of US MNCs: an empirical study with implications for
host government policy’, Multinational Business Review 7(2):
97–105.
Mytelka, L.K. (1991) Strategic Partnerships and the World
Economy, Pinter: London.
OECD (1992) Technology and the Economy, OECD: Paris.
Osborn, R.N. and Baughn, C.C. (1990) ‘Forms of interorganiza-
tional governance for multinational alliances’, Academy of
Management Journal 33(3): 503–519.
Oster, S.M. (1999) Modern Competitive Analysis, Oxford Uni-
versity Press: New York.
Ostergard, R.L. (2000) ‘The measurement of intellectual
property rights protection’, Journal of International Business
Studies 31(2): 349–360.
Oxley, J.E. (1997) ‘Appropriability hazards and governance in
strategic alliances: a transaction cost approach’, Journal of Law,
Economics, and Organization 13(3): 387–409.
Oxley, J.E. (1999) ‘Institutional environment and the mechanism
of governance: the impact of intellectual property protection
on the structure of inter-firm alliances’, Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization 38(3): 283–309.
Patel, P. and Pavitt, K. (1991) ‘Large firms in the production
of the world’s technology: an important case of
non-globalization’, Journal of International Business Studies
22(1): 1–21.
Pisano, G.P. (1989) ‘Using equity participation to sup-
port exchange: evidence from the biotechnology indus-
try’, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 5(1):
109–126.
Primo Braga, C.A., Fink, C. and Paz Sepulveda, C. (2000)
‘Intellectual property rights and economic development’,
World Bank Discussion Paper No. 412, The World Bank:
Washington, DC.
Rapp, R.T. and Rozek, R.P. (1990) ‘Benefits and costs of
intellectual property rights protection in developing coun-
tries’, Journal of World Trade 24(5): 75–102.
Ring, P. and van de Ven, A. (1992) ‘Structuring cooperative
relationships between organizations’, Strategic Management
Journal 13(7): 483–498.
Saggi, K. (2000) ‘Trade, foreign direct investment, and interna-
tional technology transfer’, Policy Research Working Paper
2349, The World Bank: Washington, DC.
Sampson, R.C. (2004) ‘The cost of misaligned governance in
R&D alliances’, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization,
20: 484–526.
Seyoum, B. (1996) ‘The impact of intellectual property rights on
foreign direct investment’, Colombia Journal of World Business
31: 50–59.
Smarzynska, B.K. (2002) ‘The composition of foreign direct
investment and protection of intellectual property rights’,
Policy Research Working Paper 2786, The World Bank:
Washington, DC.
Summers, R. and Heston, A. (1991) ‘The Penn World Table
(Mark 5): an expanded set of international comparisons,
1950–1988’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 106(May):
327–368.
Teece, D. (1986) ‘Profiting from technological innovation:
implications for integration, collaboration, licensing and
public policy’, Research Policy 15(6): 285–305.
Varsakelis, N.C. (2001) ‘The impact of patent protection,
economic openness and national culture on R&D investment:
a cross-country empirical investigation’, Research Policy 30(7):
1059–1068.
Williamson, O.E. (1996) The Mechanisms of Governance, Oxford
University Press: New York.
Yu, C.-M.J. and Tang, M.-J. (1992) ‘International joint ventures:
theoretical considerations’, Managerial and Decision Economics
13: 331–342.
Intellectual property rights John Hagedoorn et al
185
Journal of International Business StudiesAbout the authors
John Hagedoorn is Professor of International
Business and Strategy at the Department of Orga-
nization and Strategy, Faculty of Economics and
Business Administration at Maastricht University.
His research interests include international busi-
ness, strategic management and applied industrial
organisation, with a focus on alliances, mergers and
acquisitions, and innovation.
Danie ¨lle Cloodt is a doctoral candidate at the
Department of Organization and Strategy, Faculty
of Economics and Business Administration at
Maastricht University.
Hans van Kranenburg is an Associate Professor of
Industrial Organization and Strategy, Faculty of
Economics and Business Administration at Maas-
tricht University. His research interests include
industry dynamics, anti-trust issues, international
business, strategic behaviour of firms and commu-
nications industries.
Accepted by Nicolai Juul Foss, Departmental Editor, 30 August 2004. This paper has been with the authors for two revisions.
Intellectual property rights John Hagedoorn et al
186
Journal of International Business Studies